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Abstract 
 
The current study attempts to understand the relationships among 
Environmental Quality (EQ), Human Development (HD) and political and governance 
regime in a cross-country framework. The underlying hypothesis is that in addition to 
income, as reflected from the literature on Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) 
hypothesis, several other factors, including social and political ones, may influence 
environmental decision making, and thereby environmental sustainability, in a country. 
The EQ of the countries in the current study is denoted by their Environmental 
Performance Index (2008). Human development is represented by Human Development 
Index (2007) and Human Poverty Index (2006). Democracy Index (2008) and Corruption 
Perceptions Index (2008) are considered as proxies for political transparency in a 
country and its susceptibility to rent-seeking activities respectively. The regression 
results confirm the closer association between the socio-economic and socio-political 
factors in a country and its environmental performance.  
 
 
Keywords:  environmental quality; human development; economic growth; democracy; 
corruption; environmental Kuznets curve. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The environmental sustainability of a country / region is generally influenced by 
a number of factors. The literature on environmental sustainability has focused on 
several routes through which growth-environment process in a country could be affected. 
First, the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) hypothesis focuses on the relationship 
between income level of a country (as measured by per capita income) and its 
environmental quality, indicating that growing income level beyond a threshold might be 
associated with the demand for better environment and consequent adoption of superior 
governance (e.g. better pollution abatement practices). Second, the Pollution Haven 
Hypothesis (PHH) looks into the possibility of environmental degradation in a country 
owing to trade-investment nexus, i.e., whether the FDI flow in a country is directed 
more towards the pollution-intensive sectors and influencing the production pattern 
negatively. Third, the Natural Resource Curse Hypothesis (NRCH) proposes a negative 
relationship between natural resource endowment and growth scenario in a country.1  
 
In line with the EKC, PHH and NRCH mentioned above, it could be argued that 
a couple of related factors might also influence environmental performance of a country. 
For instance, enhanced economic growth in a country may get translated into economic 
development and improve Human Development (HD) level. The HD augmentation in 
the current period,  may  in turn strengthen the perception about environmental 
sustainability in the subsequent periods. Therefore, enhancement of HD may be 
considered as a positive factor for improving environmental performance.  
 
Second, despite growing income / HD, the PHH effect might get intensified in a 
country if the government is not sensitive to the requirement of the population. This 
might happen when the government for instance is autocratic and hence not concerned 
about facing the electorate in long run.   
 
On the other hand, a similar scenario might occur if the environmental 
governance is susceptible to pressures from the local firms / MNCs involved in 
environmentally-sensitive business activities. In both these cases, the existing political 
                                               
1  Komarulzaman and Alisjahbana (2006) noted that countries like Iran, Venezuela etc. endowed with 
oil and gas generally experience a lower economic growth rate as compared to their natural resource 
poor counterparts like such as Japan, Singapore, South Korea etc. 
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economic and governance scenario and the presence of rent-seeking activities, may lead 
to environmental degradation.  
 
Moreover, the influence on socio-economic and social-political factors on growth 
may get consolidated through NRCH route as well. The literature on NRCH suggests 
that natural resource base may produce a negative impact on growth if considered in 
isolation, but a positive direct impact on growth may be witnessed if explanatory 
variables on socio-political (e.g. corruption), economic (e.g. investment, openness, terms 
of trade), and socio-economic (e.g. schooling) indicators are included (Papyrakis and 
Gerlagh, 2003). 
 
The current paper attempts to estimate the determinants of environmental 
performance in a country, by looking at the socio-economic (e.g. – economic growth, 
HD) and social-political (e.g. - democracy, corruption) factors. The paper is organized 
along the following lines. First the relationship between environmental Quality (EQ) of a 
country and its income level (EKC hypothesis) is explored. The relationship between EQ 
and Human Development (HD) is analyzed next. Human development, apart from 
augmenting demand for cleaner environment, may also increase the demand for political 
freedom. Therefore, the association between HD and political freedom and governance is 
explored next. To interpret the results in a better light, the relationship among 
corruption, income and democracy are explored next. The subsequent analysis focuses on 
the relationship between environmental performance of a country and democracy and 
corruption respectively. At the end, policy conclusions are drawn on the basis of the 
derived results.   
 
2. Data  
 
The idea in the present analysis is to identify the determinants of the 
environmental performance of the countries. In accordance with availability of latest 
data, 2007-08 has been taken as the period of analysis. In other words, a cross-section 
analysis has been attempted here. The data series used for the current analysis has been 
obtained from various reports, published by academic forums as well as international 
and multilateral agencies. A total of 168 countries, for whom data on the environmental, 
socio-economic and socio-political achievements in the recent period are obtainable, are 
considered for the analysis.  
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The data on Environmental Performance Index has been obtained from 
‘Environmental Performance Index 2008’ by Esty et al (2008), published by Yale Center 
for Environmental Law and Policy. Higher EPI Score for a country implies better 
environmental quality. Switzerland is at the top position in the list with a score of 95.5, 
while Niger is placed at the bottom with a score of 39.1. 
 
The data on Human Development (HD) has been taken from the ‘Human 
Development Report’ (2009), published by the UNDP. The HD parameters considered 
here for constructing the ranking include income, health profile and education 
achievements. It is observed from the report that Norway is at the top position with a 
score of 0.971, while Niger is at the bottom with a score of 0.340. The data on Human 
Poverty Index (HPI, HPI-1 and HPI-2) and income levels of a country (measured 
through PCGDP) is also obtained from the Human Development Report (2009).2 
 
The data on political freedom of a country (i.e., democracy index) has been 
collected from the Economist Intelligence Unit’s ‘Index of Democracy 2008’ report (EIU, 
2008). Higher DI score obtained by a country implies that it is more democratic. Sweden 
tops the list with a score of 9.88, while North Korea with a score of 0.86 is located at the 
bottom. In order to segregate the various dimensions of political freedom in a country 
and their impact on environment, apart from the composite score on democratic 
achievements, several sub-indices are also considered in the current regression analysis. 
The sub-indices considered here include, Electoral Process and Pluralism Score, 
Functioning of Government Score, Political Participation Score, Political Culture Score, 
Civil Liberties Score etc.   
 
The effect of corruption in a country is measured through the ‘Corruption 
Perceptions Index’ for the year 2008, taken from ‘Global Corruption Report 2009: 
Corruption and the Private Sector’, published by Transparency International (2009). 
Higher score in the ranking denotes a less corrupt society. Denmark tops the list with a 
score of 9.3, while Myanmar is located at the other extreme with a score of 1.3. 
                                               
2  Interestingly, the HDI and HPI of the countries are often negatively related. For instance, Qatar is 
having a HDI score of 0.910 (highest 0.971, Norway), while it’s HPI score is 5.0 (highest 59.8, 
Afghanistan). Similarly for Netherlands the HDI and HPI scores are 0.964 and 7.4 respectively. On the 
other hand, Afghanistan is characterized by low HDI and high HPI scores of 0.352 and 59.8 
respectively. 
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The short forms of the variables used in the regression models of the analysis are 
presented below: 
 
EPI08SCR  Environmental Performance Index 2008 Score 
PCGDP07 Per Capita Gross Domestic Product 2007 (PPP USD) 
HDI07SCR Human Development Index 2007 Score 
HPI07VAL Human Poverty Index 2006 Value (%) 
DISCORE Democracy Index 2008 Score 
DIEPSCR Democracy Index 2008 - Electoral Process and Pluralism Score (Sub-index) 
DIFGSCR Democracy Index 2008 - Functioning of Government Score (Sub-index) 
DIFGSCR Democracy Index 2008 - Functioning of Government Score (Sub-index) 
DIPPSCR Democracy Index 2008 - Political Participation Score (Sub-index) 
DIPCLSCR Democracy Index 2008 - Political Culture Score (Sub-index) 
DICLSCR Democracy Index 2008 - Civil Liberties Score (Sub-index) 
DEMSCR Full Democracy (=1) and Otherwise (=0) 
LNCPI08 Logarithm of Corruption Perceptions Index 2008 Score 
 
3. Results 
 
3.1 Environment and Income 
 
The literature on the relationship between Per Capita Gross Domestic Product 
(PCGDP) of a country and its environmental performance generally attempts to verify 
the existence of an inverted U-shaped curve in the PCGDP versus pollution indicator 
plane (‘Environmental Kuznets Curve’ (EKC)). The relationship implies that EQ 
worsens up to a certain PCI level, but improves afterwards with prosperity, as countries 
shift to cleaner production technologies or focus more on pollution abatement (Andreoni 
and Levinson, 2001). Studies based on both ambient concentration of pollutants 
(Grossman and Krueger, 1995; Selden and Song, 1994) or actual emissions of pollutants 
(Bruvoll and Medin, 2003; de Bruyn et al., 1998) support the EKC hypothesis. Recent 
studies show that while local pollutants like Sulphur dioxide (SO2), Suspended 
Particulate Matter (SPM), Carbon monoxide (CO), etc. support EKC hypothesis; other 
pollutants exhibit either monotonicity or a N-shaped relationship (Dinda, 2004). 
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The Following model is estimated here: 
 
εββ
ββββα
+++
++++=
DISCOREHDI07SCR
PCGDP07^4 PCGDP07^3PCGDP07^2PCGDP0708
65
4321SCREPI  
 
where α  is a constant, β s are coefficients, and ε  is the disturbance term.  
 
The regression results showing the relationship between environmental 
performance and income levels of the countries are reported in Table 1. It is observed 
from the table that there is a significant relationship between the two series. In order to 
understand the non-linearity in the relationship, the higher order terms of income are 
also incorporated in the model and the significance of these terms in Model 1 and Model 
2 confirm the presence of non-linearity in the relationship. It is observed that while the 
first order (PCGDP07) and cubic (PCGDP07ˆ3) terms are positively related, the square 
(PCGDP07ˆ2) and the quadruple (PCGDP07ˆ4) terms are negatively related. In other 
words, it is found that EPI of the countries get influenced by growing income level, it 
increases initially with income, but decreases with further rise of the same. Hence unlike 
the relationship proposed by the EKC hypothesis, an inverted U-shaped curve is 
obtained, where EPI goes down with subsequent rise in income.3   
 
Model 3 attempts to estimate the relationship between environment, income, HD 
and democracy index. It is observed from the regression results that while environmental 
performance of a country is positively related to its HD and democracy index, its 
relationship with respect to PCNSDP totally reverses. To be precise while PCGDP07 is 
now negatively related to EPI, PCGDP07ˆ2 is positively related to it, in line with the 
EKC hypothesis. Therefore, greater political freedom and higher human development 
level, in addition to income growth, are found to be conducive for better environment. 
The obtained result also suggests there is need for separately estimating the impact of 
HD and political freedom on EPI.   
 
The interrelationship between EPI and PCGDP, as reflected from the regression 
analysis is reported in Diagram 1. An inverted and slanting S-shaped relationship 
between the two series is noticed from the diagram. The diagram suggests that the EPI 
                                               
3  For instance – for Kuwait, PCGDP07 is USD 47,812 and EPI08SCR is 64.5 and for United Arab 
Emirates – PCGDP07 is USD 54,626 and EPI08SCR is 64.0.  
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increases initially with income, but comes down after reaching a peak, which arguably is 
caused by intensification of economic activities. However, with further rise in income, 
EPI reaches a trough and starts increasing once again. Clearly the obtained results show 
a richer relationship pattern vis-à-vis the U-shaped contour proposed by EKC 
hypothesis. 
 
3.2 Environment and Human Development 
 
It is increasingly believed that environmental problems should no longer be 
viewed as the side effects of development process but rather be an integral part of it 
(Ginkel et al., 2001), which has been reflected in the Target 9 of the United Nations’ 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Melnick et al. (2005) argue that achieving 
environmental sustainability requires careful balancing of HD front as well while 
maintaining a stable environment that predictably and regularly provides resources and 
protects people from natural calamities. It is also held that socio-economic inequality 
leads to environmental inequality, which may consequently affect the overall extent of 
EQ (Boyce, 2003).  
 
There have been several cross-country empirical analyses for estimating the 
relationship between variants of EPI and HD, and presence of non-linearity is generally 
reported. For instance, comparison of the Environmental Degradation Index (EDI) 
created by Jha and Bhanu Murthy (2001) for 174 countries with their HDI supported 
the existence of an inverted N-shaped global EKC rather than an inverted U-shaped one.  
 
The Following models are estimated here: 
 
εββββα +++++= DISCORE HDI07SCR^3HDI07SCR^2HDI07SCR08 4321SCREPI  
and, 
 
εββββα +++++= DISCORE HPI07VAL^3HPI07VAL^2HPI07VAL08 4321SCREPI  
 
The regression models estimated by the current analysis are summarized in Table 
2. It is observed from the first three reported models that there exists a significant non-
linear relationship between EPI and HDI. In other words, enhancement in HD influences 
the EPI of a country significantly. It is observed that while the coefficient of the first 
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order term is positive, the same for the higher order terms are negative in sign. However 
the significance level of the higher order terms is found to be lower. The obtained result 
supports the non-linearity hypothesis in line with the literature. Given the sign of the 
coefficients of the HDI term, it is observed that EPI increases with HDI but rate of 
growth of the former may come down with growth in the latter. In other words, at a 
higher level of HDI, increase in HD leads to little improvement in EPI scores.  
 
The relationship between EQ and Human Poverty Index (HPI) can be observed 
from model four as reported in Table 2. It is observed from the results that the first 
order and the cubic term of the HPI07VAL variable are positively related to EQ, while 
the square term is negatively related. The first order term is however not significant.4 In 
other words like the HDI case, the HPI07VAL is also found to be having a non-linear 
relationship with EQ. 
 
The fifth model looks into the relationship between EQ, HD and democracy. It is 
observed that both the variables are positively related to EQ, confirming that high order 
of human development as well as democracy level is conducive for better environmental 
achievement.  
 
The relationship between EPI and HDI is reported in Diagram 2, which shows a 
slanting S-shaped of figure. In other words, like the case of income, the EKC hypothesis 
is not supported in case of EQ-HD interface as well.   
 
Diagram 3 reports the non-linear relationship between EPI and HPI07VAL, in 
line with the regression results reported in Table 2. A slanting and inverted S-shaped 
curve emerges from the relationship between the two. As observed from the diagram, 
initially with rise in HPI, the EPI increases, but it decreases after a certain point. The 
decrease continues with growing level of HPI, but beyond a very high level of HPI, EPI 
increase once again.  
 
The difference in the behavior of two indicators of HDI with respect to EPI can 
be explained by looking at the interrelation between the two series. It is observed from 
                                               
4  A regression with only HPI07VAL shows that its coefficient is having a negative sign and is found to 
be significant.  
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Diagram 4 that the line plotted in HDI-HPI plane in negatively sloped. The reason is 
that there are many countries with high HDI score but low HPI score and vice versa.5  
 
3.3 Human Development and Democracy 
 
The relationship between HD and democracy is a major area of discussion in 
economic literature (Drèze and Sen, 1995; Przeworski et al, 2000). The idea here is that 
increasing HD level enhances citizen confidence and expectation from the policymakers 
and as a result their participation level in democratic process increases. On the other 
hand, a democratic government is always wary of the political business cycle in long run 
and hence attempts to enhance economic growth and HD level of the electorate in its 
own interest. However an autocratic regime may or may not share this motivation. The 
development process of Singapore (high HD) and Cambodia (moderate HD) may present 
the two extreme cases in this regard.  
 
The relationship between HD and democracy can be explained further with the 
findings of the UNDP (2004) report on Latin American countries. It is observed from the 
report that despite progress in certain areas, participation in elections is often uneven, 
and in some countries new entrants to electoral contests still faces barriers. As a result 
the core issues of poverty and inequality are often not properly addressed.6 On the other 
hand, the lack of economic and human resources leads to weakened judicial system, 
which affects the growth process further.  
 
 
The Following model is estimated here: 
 
εββα +++= 07DISCOREHDI07SCR 21 PCGDP  
 
The regression analysis performed in the current framework on the relationship 
between HDI and democracy is reported in Table 3. It is observed from the table that 
human development is positively and linearly related to both democracy and income 
level of the countries, though the coefficient of the latter is found to be very small. In 
                                               
5  The point has been reported in Footnote 2.  
6  UNDP (2004) notes that the level of inequality in Latin American countries is higher than the 
corresponding world average. 
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other words, the countries characterized by higher levels of income and better 
democratic set up are prone to witness higher HD achievements. 
 
The diagrammatic representation of the relationship between HD and democracy 
is noted in Diagram 5. The diagram represents the linear relationship between the two 
series. The positively sloped line indicates that with rise in democracy, the level of HDI 
also increases. Now, given the relationship between HDI and EPI established earlier, 
level of political freedom in a country (i.e. democracy index) should logically have a 
bearing on their environmental sustainability (i.e., EPI) as well, which is explored in 
subsequent analysis.   
 
3.4 Human Development and Corruption 
 
Before going into the relationship between environmental sustainability and 
corruption, an analysis of the relationship between Human Development and Corruption 
might provide interesting insights, given the influence of HD on EQ. Though corruption 
is a global phenomenon, its effect is found to be more prevalent in emerging economies, 
developing countries and least developed countries (Fokuoh Ampratwum, 2008).   
 
The economic intuition suggests that with growing level of human development, 
the demand for better governance should increase and as a result, the rent-seeking 
activities may go down. However the real world situation is more complicated then the 
theorized version, given the fact that forces of corruption affects the development process 
of different countries in unique manner.  
 
Tran (2008) has argued in favour of a multi-equilibria (virtuous and vicious) 
relationship between HD and corruption. The virtuous equilibrium exists in rich 
countries, while the vicious equilibrium occurs in poor countries, thereby limiting their 
development potential further. He has argued that investment in human capabilities can 
play a crucial role in preventing corruption, especially after crossing a threshold level of 
HD. The idea is that if at a lower level of income, the corruption effect is rampant, then 
the very process of HD suffers, which may adversely influence governance and 
environmental sustainability as well. The adverse relationship between the two has been 
noted by Selçuk (2006) as well, who reported that corruption reduces expenditures on 
HD front (i.e., education and health). UNDP (2003), focusing on the inter-linkage 
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between corruption and HD in Burkina Faso, also supported the interrelationship 
between the two.  
 
The Following models are estimated here: 
 
εβββα ++++=  70^20808HDI07SCR 321 PCGDPLNCPILNCPI  
and, 
 
εβββα ++++=  70^20808HPIVAL07 321 PCGDPLNCPILNCPI  
 
The regression results of the current analysis are reported in Table 4. Models 1 
and 2 look into the relationship between HDI and CPI. PCGDP07 is used as a control 
variable in our models. It is observed that while the first order term of LNCPI08 is 
having a positive coefficient, the second order term is having a negative coefficient. The 
income term, as expected, is having a positive coefficient, though the magnitude of the 
same is quite small. The obtained result suggests that with rise in HD level, CPI 
generally increases (i.e., society becomes less corrupt), but may decrease at the higher 
level of HDI.  
 
Models 3 and 4 look into the relationship between HPI07VAL and CPI. It is 
observed that the result is opposite in nature to the HDI case, as revealed from the sign 
of the relevant coefficients. In other words, rising CPI is associated with a corresponding 
decline in HD level. 
 
The relationship between HDI and corruption and HPI07VAL and corruption are 
noted in Diagrams 6 and 7 respectively. In line with the regression results reported 
earlier, it is observed that while the former is having a positive slope, the latter is having 
a negative slope. Both the curves are found to be non-linear.  
 
3.5 Corruption and Income 
 
The interrelationship between corruption and income is a widely researched area. 
It is generally agreed that corruption creates a dampening effect on economic growth 
(Selçuk, 2006; Cooper et al, 2006; Mauro, 1996). Mo (2001) has reported that even a one 
percent increase in corruption level decreases GDP growth by almost three quarters of a 
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percent. Fokuoh Ampratwum (2008) notes the serious income implications of corruption 
in the emerging economies, developing countries and LDCs.  
 
The following model is estimated here: 
 
 
 
The empirical findings of the current analysis are reported in Table 5. It is 
observed from the table that there exist a non-linearity in the relationship between 
corruption and income level, while the coefficient of the first order term (PCGDP07) is 
positive and significant, the same for the second order term (PCGDP07ˆ2) is negative 
and significant. In other words, while the CPI score increases (i.e., corruption decreases) 
with income, at a higher level of income CPI decreases. 
 
The relationship between CPI and PCGDP is shown with the help of Diagram 8. 
It is observed from the diagram that with rise in income, corruption level increases upto 
a point but comes down beyond that. The curvature is caused owing to Qatar, which is 
having a moderate CPI (6.5), despite having a high level of PCGDP. 
 
3.6 Corruption and Democracy 
 
Corruption is generally argued to be negatively associated with level of political 
freedom. Selçuk (2006) has argued that corruption distorts the two basic norms of 
democracy, namely equality and openness.   
 
The empirical literature on interrelationship between the two is quite rich. For 
instance, the analysis of Selçuk (2006) could be noted which worked with the Corruption 
Perception Index (1999, 2000) published by Transparency International and the Political 
Freedom Index (1998) published by Freedom House. The empirical results supported the 
negative relationship between the two series.  In other words, with advent of democracy, 
corruption is likely to go down.   
 
εβββα ++++= SCRHDIPCGDPPCGDPLNCPI 072^070708 321
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The following model is estimated here: 
 
εβ
ββββα
++
++++=
07
07DISCORE^3DISCORE^2 DISCORE08
5
4321
PCGDP
SCRHDILNCPI
 
 
The regression results of the analysis are reported in Table 6. PCGDP and HDI 
are taken as the control variables. It is observed from the table that level of democracy 
is showing a non-linear relationship with corruption level. The coefficient of the first 
order term (DISCORE) is found to be positive in all three models. On the other hand, 
the coefficient of the second order term (DISCOREˆ2) is positive in the second model, 
but becomes negative in the third model with introduction of the third order term 
(DISCOREˆ3), which itself is positive and significant. On the whole greater political 
freedom is found to be conducive for better management of corruption.  
 
The relationship between democracy and corruption is shown with the help of 
Diagram 9. It is observed from the diagram that with rise in democracy level, CPI is 
increasing at a decreasing rate upto a point, but beyond a point, the corruption level is 
found to be increasing at an increasing rate. The increase is caused owing to the 
presence of countries like Sweden, New Zealand, Denmark, Australia, all of which are 
characterized by both higher CPI and DI scores.    
 
3.7 Environment and Democracy 
 
Given the earlier evidence that environment and democracy are both influenced 
by several common factors like income and HD, there is a need now to evaluate the 
direct relationship between the two. It is observed from the international literature on 
environment and democracy that no evident conclusion on interrelationship between the 
two series can be drawn, as the evidence reported is ambiguous. One side of the 
literature reports the positive relationship between democracy and environment. For 
instance, Payne (1995) noted the view expressed by Al Gore that spread of democracy is 
a prerequisite for the achievement of better EQ. Morrison (2009) also noted that 
presence of democracy positively influence provision of environmental public goods as 
they relate to human health. It is observed that liberal democracies are more 
forthcoming in this arena as compared to less liberal regimes. Silvia (1997) supported 
this contention by providing the Chilean example, where the laissez-faire principle 
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adopted by the military regime not necessarily championed the environmental 
sustainability. 
 
Jasanoff (1996) noted that the citizen involvement in ensuring better quality of 
environment is increasingly witnessed and provides the US experience in terms of 
determination of carcinogen traces in commodities, so as to avoid the risk of cancer. The 
analysis noted that the risk assessment over the years has become more responsive to its 
multiple political constituencies. A similar scenario has been witnessed at Europe 
(especially Germany) as well.7 On the other hand, Chatrchyan (2004) noted that shallow 
democratization and stagnation may adversely affect environmental protection in post-
communist countries. 
 
The complex relationship between democracy, liberty and type of democracy has 
been explore by Bernauer and Vasiliki (2004). The study reported that while democracy 
leads to higher EQ, labor union power is systematically, negatively related to EQ. It also 
reported that presidential democracies are better environmental performers than 
parliamentarian democracies. Interestingly, EQ was reported to go up with the size of 
the winning electoral coalition, arguably indicating the ease with which a government 
can pursue its agenda. 
 
The role of state, democracy level and involvement in international organizations 
also plays a key role in this regard (Li and Reuveny, 2004; Tucker, 2008). The cross-
sectional empirical analysis of Congleton (1992) involving 118 countries shows that 
environmental policies in a country, including both pollution outputs and willingness to 
take part in international conventions on environment, could be affected by political 
institutions. The panel data analysis of Ruoff (2009a, 2009b) involving developing 
countries also stresses the role of participation in international environmental 
organizations. The role of environmentalism has also been critically analyzed through the 
democracy prism. For instance, Parks et al (2006) has examined whether domestic 
political institutions (e.g. party structures, nature of the policy-making process etc.) 
promote or hinder the passage of environmental foreign aid policy. 
                                               
7  “Citizen protests and strong leadership from the Green Party led Germany in 1990 to enact the 
Genetic Engineering Law, which provided a framework for controlling previously unregulated 
industrial activity in biotechnology. Responding to citizen pressure, it also opened up participation on 
the government’s key biotechnology advisory committee and created a new public hearing process for 
releasing genetically engineered organisms into the environment.” Jasanoff (1996). 
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The literature in this sphere also focus on the institutional mechanisms though 
which the citizens can influence environmental risk decisions. Fiorino (1989, 1990) has 
noted that the major routes in this category include: public hearings, initiatives, public 
surveys, negotiated rule making, and citizens review panels. Though each mechanism is 
characterized with certain positive aspects, several weak spots are also inherent in each 
of them; thereby relying on any one becomes a difficult proposition.  
 
The other branch of empirical literature however contradicts this standpoint. For 
instance Midlarsky (1998) has considered six measures of environmental protection or 
degradation (deforestation, carbon dioxide emission, soil erosion by water, protected land 
area, freshwater availability, soil erosion by chemicals etc.) as the dependent variables in 
the multiple regression analyses. The analysis showed that the statistically significant 
effect of democracy on the environment actually was negative for several categories, 
contrary to general perception. The study concluded that theoretical assumptions 
regarding the positive effect of democracy on the environment need to be re-examined. 
Bernauer et al (2008) also noted that network are more important than the effects of 
democracy. 
 
The analysis of Cheng and Cho (2005) examined the effect of democracy on a 
country’s environmental conditions through a panel data analysis involving 27 Asian 
countries over 1991-2001. While the study measures democracy by political rights and 
civil liberties; Carbon dioxide damage, CO2 emissions, energy depletion, and net forest 
depletion are used as the dependent variables to show the environmental situations in a 
country. The results indicate that democratization process in Asian countries might have 
negative influence for environmental scenario.  
 
The analysis of Kelso (2006) indicates that the relationship between political 
democracy, civil liberties and EQ may not be unidirectional: while political democracy 
does decrease particulate emissions, but both deforestation and carbon dioxide emissions 
increase with greater civil liberties. The ambiguity in the relationship between 
democracy and the environment has also been reported by Walker (1999), aided by case 
studies from Malawi, South Africa, and Mozambique. Interestingly, the case studies 
revealed that even where the goals of democracy are realized; both negative as well as 
positive environmental consequences are reported, thereby weakening the causal link 
between the two. 
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Several studies have attempted to provide an explanation behind this result and 
the political freedom scenario in the communist countries is often cited. For instance, 
Scruggs (2009) noted that previous positive findings between EQ and democracy can be 
attributed to changes in a few Eastern European countries. It also noted that with 
controls for general economic liberalization, no noticeable beneficial effect of democracy 
on environmental performance could be observed. 
 
The following model is estimated here: 
 
εββα +++= SCRHDIDemocracySCREPI 0708 21  
 
where, in various versions of the model in place of democracy, DISCORE, 
DICLSCR, DIEPSCR, DIFGSCR, DIPPSCR are used as discussed earlier.  
 
The regression results of the current analysis are reported in Table 7. It is 
observed from the table that democracy scores of the countries and their environment 
performance in general are positively related. Model 1 looks into the relationship 
between overall democracy score of a country and its environmental performance. The 
same hypothesis is tested in the subsequent models as well. In models 2, 3 and 5, more 
than one set of democracy parameters are considered. It is observed that the democracy 
indicators are having statistically significant coefficients with positive signs. Hence we 
observe that the econometric finding of the current analysis is supporting the contention 
that democratic set up is conducive for better environmental performance.  
 
The visual representation of the regression results obtained in Table 7 is noted in 
Diagram 10, which represents a linear relationship between EPI and DI. While the 
autocratic countries like North Korea, Chad and Turkmenistan are located at the south-
west end of the diagram, major liberal democracies like Sweden, Norway and Iceland are 
placed at the north-east end of the same.  
 
3.8 Environment and Corruption 
 
The literature on environment and corruption is quite rich and like the case of 
environment and democracy, the literature is generally divided. Though it could be 
theoretically argued that corruption may tend to compromise the environmental 
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sustainability vis-à-vis the private / multinational business interest, the empirical 
findings not always necessarily support this viewpoint. The ambiguity in empirical 
findings could be explained by the fact that selection of country / period has a major 
bearing over the findings.  
 
The literature supporting a negative correlation between corruption and 
environmental performance is noted first. Welsch (2004) theorizes the link between the 
two by arguing that corruption reduces income, and the lower income level may lead to 
higher pollution levels. Similar viewpoint has been expressed by other studies as well 
(Lopez and Mitra 2000, Damania et al. 2003). Looking at the social  and  economic  
costs  of corruption, Dillion et al (2006) noted that bribery  and  poor  enforcement  of  
laws  tend to lower environmental sustainability of people and thereby their wellbeing.8 
Arguing along the same line Winbourne (2002) noted that corruption leads to activities 
like trafficking in wildlife and similar natural resources, leading to their depletion / 
extinction.9 Similarly, Pellegrini (2006) has argued that institutional improvements and 
reductions in corruption might induce higher economic growth rates and stricter 
environmental policies. 
 
Apart from bribery of the administrative side, the nexus between business and 
judiciary might also lead to environmental degradation. For instance, Kotlobay (2002) 
noted that in Russia in 1999 6,383 forest-related illegal action cases were investigated; 
3,113 cases were brought to court and finally in only 907 cases any penal action was 
taken.  
 
The other side of the licensure argues that corruption may not be environmentally 
destructive in a general sense (Robbins 2000). The empirical analysis of Morse (2006) 
looked into the corruption-environmental sustainability interface through empirical 
analysis of Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI, 2002) and its component variables 
                                               
8  To support the argument, Dillion et al (2006) quoted the tussle between Kayu Lapis Industry logging 
company and the local community of Waisor in Indonesia during 2001. While illegal logging was going 
on, the local Police Mobile Brigade (Brimob) supported the company against the community, as they 
were recipient of bribes from the former. 
9  The major channels in environmental corruption include bribery in environmental inspections and 
permitting system, overlooking of illicit consignments of endangered wildlife species, development of 
environmentally damaging policies and practices, unfair allocation of environmental resources etc. 
(Winbourne, 2002; Mastny and French, 2002). 
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and Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI, 2002). The study found both CPI and ESI to be 
statistically significantly related to income (proxied as GDP/capita) and argued that 
environmental sustainability declined with decreasing income while corruption worsened. 
The study further divided ESI (2002) into various sub-indicators representing pressure, 
state, impact and response and regressed them on ‘residual CPI’ (2002), after removing 
the income effect. The regression results indicated that for the most part the sub-
indicators of ESI are not correlated with ‘residual’ CPI. 
 
The following model is estimated here: 
 
εββββα +++++= SCRHDISCREPI 07LNCPI08^3LNCPI08^2 LNCPI0808 4321  
 
The regression results are reported in Table 8. It is observed from various versions 
of the model that environmental performance of a country is positively related to the 
CPI score (i.e., if the society is less corrupt). It is observed that the higher order values 
of CPI are not having a significant relationship with EPI, indicating a linear relationship 
between the two. Interestingly, the HDI variable is not found to be having any 
significant relationship with EPI in presence of CPI indicators, so we dropped those 
models from the present paper.  
 
The linear relationship between CPI and EPI is shown with the help of Diagram 
11. While the countries like Iraq, Myanmar, Haiti and Afghanistan characterized by 
poorer environmental achievements and higher corruption are located in South-West of 
the diagram, the better performers on both counts (e.g., Denmark, New Zealand and 
Sweden) are placed in the North-East corner.  
 
4  Conclusion 
 
The Copenhagen Summit (2009) recently organized has shown the reluctance of 
the several developed as well as developing countries to go for further commitment with 
respect to Kyoto Protocol to prevent climate changes and global warming. Given the 
fact that income indicators alone may not explain the behaviour of the countries with 
respect to their current level of environmental governance as well as future commitment 
in multilateral environmental agreements, the current study intends to analyze the 
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influence of the socio-economic and socio-political variables on their environmental 
performance through a cross-country analysis.  
 
The literature on the linkage between environment-corruption and environment-
democracy is quite rich. However, it is observed that a considerable section of the studies 
in this sphere are qualitative and case based in nature. A major section of the empirical 
studies conducted so far have undertaken the analysis with sub-categories of 
environmental performance (e.g. forest, water, air quality etc.), thereby not focusing on 
the macro perspective. On the other hand, several studies focusing on the macro 
variables (e.g. CPI, ESI) have been conducted with the 2002-03 period data, which 
misses out the dynamics in the post the United Nations Climate Change Conference in 
Bali (2007). The current study is therefore an attempt to understand the scenario in the 
recent period with a cross-sectional data analysis during 2007-08.  
 
The major findings of the analysis are summarized in the following. First, it is 
observed that EPI of the countries get influenced by growing income level. It increases 
initially with income, but decreases with further rise of the same. Hence, unlike the EKC 
hypothesis an inverted U-shaped curve is obtained. However, if other factors like HD 
achievement and democracy index are considered, the obtained regression results fall in 
line with the EKC hypothesis. Therefore, greater political freedom and higher human 
development level, in addition to income growth, are found to be conducive for better 
environment. 
 
Second, there is a behavioral difference in EPI’s response to HDI and HPI, the 
two HD achievements considered here. We find that EPI of the countries generally goes 
up with HDI, but may marginally come down at a higher HDI level. This corroborates 
the general expectation that better confidence owing to higher human development 
scenario facilitates environmental governance. The coefficient of the democracy variable 
included in the analysis is also found to be positive and significant. However, a 
diametrically opposite scenario is noted for HPI.  
 
Third, it is observed that HD is positively and linearly related to both democracy 
and income level, indicating that the countries characterized by higher levels of income 
and better democratic set up are prone to witness higher HD achievements. 
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Fourth, the regression results on the relationship between HD and corruption 
confirms presence of a non-linearity and suggests that with decline in corruption, HD 
level rises, but declines marginally for a few countries characterized by a less corrupt 
regime. An opposite picture is however noted for the relationship between HPI and 
corruption.  
 
Fifth, it is observed that there exist a non-linearity in the relationship between 
corruption and income level. While corruption initially decreases with income, at a 
higher level of PCGDP, it marginally increases. 
 
Sixth, non-linearity is also observed in the relationship between corruption and 
democracy. With rise in political freedom, corruption decreases, but initially at a slower 
rate. However beyond a particular level of political freedom, the increase in the same is 
found to be associated with higher reduction in corruption. On the whole greater 
political freedom is found to be conducive for better management of corruption.  
 
Seventh, political freedom of the countries and their EQ in general are found to 
be positively and linearly related, supporting the standpoint that democratic set up is 
conducive for better environmental performance. This signifies the presence of a more 
responsive governance mechanism towards environmental assets in liberal democracies.  
 
Finally, it is observed that environmental performance of a country is positively 
related to its ability to control corruption. A linear relationship between the two series is 
observed in the present set up. However, interestingly, other socio-economic factors like 
the HDI, do not play any role in determining the relationship here.  
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Table 1: Relationship between Environmental Performance and Income Levels 
 
Dependent Variable: EPI08SCR Independent variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 
56.81 
(39.62) *** 
54.63 
(33.62) *** 
17.52 
(5.51) *** 
PCGDP07 
0.27 X 10-2 
(9.95) *** 
0.37 X 10-2 
(7.39) *** 
- 0.39 X 10-3 
(-3.29) *** 
PCGDP07ˆ2 
-7.57E-08 
(-7.13) *** 
-1.58E-07 
(-3.95) *** 
2.78E-09 
(2.00) ** 
PCGDP07ˆ3 
5.80E-13 
(6.26) *** 
2.62E-12 
(2.51) **  
PCGDP07ˆ4  
-1.47E-17 
(-1.89) * 
 
HDI07SCR 
  71.72 
(14.37) *** 
DISCORE 
  1.06 
(3.63) *** 
R-squared 0.60 0.62 0.81 
Adjusted R-squared 0.59 0.61 0.80 
Log likelihood -504.71 -501.05 -450.66 
Durbin-Watson statistics 2.17 2.21 2.17 
Akaike information criterion 7.07 7.03 6.33 
Schwarz criterion 7.15 7.13 6.43 
F-statistic 69.40 56.19 148.36 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Method Least Squares Least Squares Least Squares 
Number of observations 166 166 166 
Included observations 144 144 144 
Note: Figure in the parenthesis shows White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error for the estimated 
coefficient. *** denotes significance at 1 percent level, while * denotes significance at 10 percent level. 
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Table 2: Relationship between Environmental Performance and Human Development 
 
Dependent Variable: EPI08SCR Independent variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Constant 
26.11 
(11.67) *** 
14.14 
(2.10) ** 
18.04 
(3.68) *** 
80.42 
(40.34) *** 
26.43 
(11.63) *** 
HDI07SCR 
62.71 
(21.55) *** 
99.42 
(4.74) *** 
81.87 
(7.46) *** 
 56.63 
(13.03) *** 
HDI07SCRˆ2  -26.72 
(- 1.74) * 
   
HDI07SCRˆ3   -12.97 
(- 1.77) * 
  
HPI07VAL 
   0.15 
(0.46) *** 
 
HPI07VALˆ2 
   
- 0.03 
(- 2.38) ** 
 
HPI07VALˆ3 
   0.40 X 10-3 
(-2.15) ** 
 
DISCORE 
    0.73 
(2.22) ** 
R-squared 0.77 0.78 0.78 0.68 0.78 
Adjusted R-squared 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.67 0.78 
Log likelihood -463.38 -462.15 -462.15 -444.48 -460.28 
Durbin-Watson statistics 2.36 2.36 2.36 2.01 2.29 
Akaike information criterion 6.46 6.46 6.46 6.84 6.43 
Schwarz criterion 6.50 6.52 6.52 6.93 6.49 
F-statistic 485.01 246.18 246.20 90.34 254.52 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Method Least Squares Least Squares Least Squares Least Squares Least 
Squares 
Number of observations 166 166 166 166 166 
Included observations 144 144 144 131 144 
Note: Figure in the parenthesis shows White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error for the estimated 
coefficient. *** denotes significance at 1 percent level, while * denotes significance at 10 percent level. 
 
 
Table 3: Relationship between Human Development and Democracy 
 
Dependent Variable: HDI07SCR Independent variables 
Model 1 Model 2 
Constant 0.46 (13.28) *** 0.49 (18.58) *** 
DISCORE 0.05 (9.96) *** 0.02 (5.66) *** 
PCGDP07  6.93E-06 (7.73) *** 
R-squared 0.36 0.62 
Adjusted R-squared 0.36 0.62 
S.E. of regression 0.14 0.11 
Sum squared residual 3.34 1.97 
Log likelihood 85.65 127.35 
Durbin-Watson statistics 2.01 2.12 
Mean dependent variable 0.73 0.73 
S.D. dependent variable 0.18 0.18 
Akaike information criterion -1.03 -1.54 
Schwarz criterion -0.99 -1.48 
F-statistic 91.23 131.57 
Prob (F-statistic) 0 0 
Method Least Squares Least Squares 
Number of observations 166 166 
Included observations 163 162 
Note: Figure in the parenthesis shows White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error for the estimated 
coefficient. *** denotes significance at 1 percent level, while * denotes significance at 10 percent level. 
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Table 4: Relationship between Human Development and Corruption 
 
Dependent Variable: HDI07SCR Dependent Variable: HPI07VAL Independent variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Constant 
0.48 
(16.04) *** 
0.36 
(6.16) *** 
33.90 
(9.76) *** 
51.38 
(6.64) *** 
LNCPI2008 
0.14 
(4.82) *** 
0.34 
(3.80) * 
- 9.84 
(-3.08) *** 
- 41.52 
( - 3.45) *** 
LNCPI2008ˆ2  
- 0.08 
(- 2.37) **  
13.53 
(3.02) *** 
PCGDP07 
5.28E-06 
(4.30) *** 
6.31E-06 
(4.06) *** 
- 0.19 X 10-3 
(-2.06) ** 
- 0.37 X 10-3 
(-3.10) *** 
R-squared 0.61 0.62 0.25 0.29 
Adjusted R-squared 0.61 0.62 0.24 0.28 
Log likelihood 123.51 125.97 -575.78 -571.56 
Durbin-Watson statistics 2.07 2.09 2.03 1.97 
Akaike information 
criterion -1.50 -1.52 7.93 7.88 
Schwarz criterion -1.44 -1.44 7.99 7.97 
F-statistic 124.16 86.43 23.95 19.62 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Method Least Squares Least Squares Least Squares Least Squares 
Number of observations 166 166 166 166 
Included observations 161 161 146 146 
Note: Figure in the parenthesis shows White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error for the estimated 
coefficient. *** denotes significance at 1 percent level, while * denotes significance at 10 percent level. 
 
 
Table 5: Relationship between Corruption and Income 
 
Dependent Variable: LNCPI2008 Independent variables 
Model 1 Model 2 
Constant 0.31 (2.38) ** 0.55 (3.23) *** 
PCGDP07 0.15 X 10-4 (5.22) *** 0.36 X 10-4 (4.39) *** 
PCGDP07ˆ2  - 0.30 X 10-10 (- 3.09) *** 
HDI07SCR 1.01 (4.71) *** 0.47 (1.49) 
R-squared 0.63 0.66 
Adjusted R-squared 0.63 0.65 
Log likelihood -35.40 -29.80 
Durbin-Watson statistics 1.96 2.07 
Akaike information criterion 0.48 0.42 
Schwarz criterion 0.53 0.50 
F-statistic 136.10 100.42 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.00 0.00 
Method Least Squares Least Squares 
Number of observations 166 166 
Included observations 161 161 
Note: Figure in the parenthesis shows White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error for the 
estimated coefficient. *** denotes significance at 1 percent level, while * denotes significance at 10 
percent level. 
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Table 6: Relationship between Corruption and Democracy 
 
Dependent Variable: LNCPI2008 Independent variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 0.25 (2.42) ** 0.39 (2.52) ** - 0.14 (0.43) 
DISCORE 0.09 (8.11) *** 0.03 (0.79) 0.37 (2.10) ** 
DISCOREˆ2  0.54 X 10-2 (1.22) - 0.06 (-1.79) * 
DISCOREˆ3   
0.39 X 10-2 
(2.01) ** 
HDI07SCR 0.37 (1.84) 0.38 (1.87) * 0.46 (2.18) ** 
PCGDP07 
0.14 X 10-4 
(6.08) *** 
0.13 X 10-4 
(5.29) *** 
0.12 X 10-4 
(4.66) *** 
R-squared 0.75 0.75 0.76 
Adjusted R-squared 0.75 0.75 0.75 
Log likelihood -4.32 -3.68 -1.64 
Durbin-Watson statistics 2.11 2.14 2.13 
Akaike information criterion 0.10 0.11 0.09 
Schwarz criterion 0.18 0.20 0.21 
F-statistic 157.31 118.47 97.38 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Method Least Squares Least Squares Least Squares 
Number of observations 166 166 166 
Included observations 161 161 161 
Note: Figure in the parenthesis shows White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error for the estimated 
coefficient. *** denotes significance at 1 percent level, while * denotes significance at 10 percent level. 
 
 
Table 7: Relationship between Environment and Democracy 
 
Dependent Variable: EPI08SCR Independent variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Constant 26.43 
(11.63) *** 
26.12 
(11.61) *** 
26.79 
(11.41) *** 
26.68 
(11.53) *** 
25.58 
(11.22) *** 
DISCORE 0.73 
(2.22) ** 
    
DICLSCR 
 0.67 
(2.78) *** 
   
DIEPSCR 
  0.45 
(2.19) ** 
  
DIFGSCR 
   0.37 
(1.47) 
 
DIPPSCR 
    0.28 
(0.79) 
HDI07SCR 
56.63 
(13.03) *** 
56.69 
(14.68) *** 
57.93 
(14.79) *** 
59.32 
(14.68) *** 
61.17 
(16.37) *** 
R-squared 0.78 0.79 0.78 0.78 0.77 
Adjusted R-squared 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.77 0.77 
Log likelihood -460.28 -458.92 -459.87 -462.35 -463.07 
Durbin-Watson statistics 2.30 2.28 2.28 2.34 2.35 
Akaike information 
criterion 6.43 6.42 6.43 6.46 6.47 
Schwarz criterion 6.50 6.48 6.49 6.53 6.54 
F-statistic 254.53 260.73 256.40 245.30 242.15 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Method Least Square Least Square Least Square Least Square Least Square 
Number of observations 166 166 166 166 166 
Included observations 144 144 144 144 144 
Note: Figure in the parenthesis shows White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error for the estimated 
coefficient. *** denotes significance at 1 percent level, while * denotes significance at 10 percent level. 
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Table 8: Relationship between Environment and Corruption 
 
Dependent Variable: EPI08SCR Independent variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 51.31 (23.31) *** 52.87 (11.06) *** 57.07 (7.30) *** 
LNCPI08 16.49 (12.20) *** 13.73 (1.83) * 1.12 (0.05) 
LNCPI08ˆ2  1.04 (0.39) 11.98 (0.67) 
LNCPI08ˆ3   - 2.82 (- 0.62) 
R-squared 0.42 0.42 0.42 
Adjusted R-squared 0.42 0.41 0.41 
S.E. of regression 9.75 9.78 9.80 
Sum squared residual 13680.10 13669.09 13647.82 
Log likelihood -538.59 -538.53 -538.42 
Durbin-Watson statistics 1.98 1.97 1.98 
Mean dependent variable 72.02 72.02 72.02 
S.D. dependent variable 12.77 12.77 12.77 
Akaike information criterion 7.41 7.42 7.43 
Schwarz criterion 7.45 7.48 7.51 
F-statistic 104.77 52.12 34.63 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Method Least Squares Least Squares Least Squares 
Number of observations 167 167 167 
Included observations 146 146 146 
Note: Figure in the parenthesis shows White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error for the estimated 
coefficient. *** denotes significance at 1 percent level, while * denotes significance at 10 percent level. 
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Diagram 1: Environmental Performance Index (EPI) – 2008 vs. Per Capita (PPP USD) 
- 2007 
 
Source: Mukherjee and Chakraborty (2010)
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Diagram 2: Environmental Performance Index (EPI) – 2008 vs. Human Development 
Index (HDI) – 2007 
 
Source: Mukherjee and Chakraborty (2010)
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Diagram 3: Environmental Performance Index (EPI) – 2008 vs. Human Poverty Index 
(HPI) - 2007 
 
Source: Mukherjee and Chakraborty (2010)
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Diagram 4: Human Development Index (HDI) - 2007 vs. Human Poverty Index (HPI) - 
2007 
 
Source: Mukherjee and Chakraborty (2010)
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Diagram 5: Human Development Index (HDI) – 2007 vs. Democracy Index – 2008 
 
Source: Mukherjee and Chakraborty (2010)
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Diagram 6: Human Development Index (HDI) – 2007 vs. Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI) - 2008 
 
Source: Mukherjee and Chakraborty (2010)
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Diagram 7: Human Poverty Index (HPI) – 2007 vs. Corruption Index (CPI) – 2008 
 
Source: Mukherjee and Chakraborty (2010)
Human Poverty Index (HPI) Value - 2007 vs Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) - 2008 
5
15
25
35
45
55
65
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)-2008 
Hu
m
an
 
Po
v
e
rt
y 
In
de
x
 
(H
PI
) V
al
u
e 
-
 
20
07
 
Diagram 8: Per Capita GDP – 2007 vs. Corruption Index (CPI) – 2008 
  
Source: Mukherjee and Chakraborty (2010)
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Diagram 9: Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) - 2008 vs. Democracy Index (DI) – 2008 
 
Source: Mukherjee and Chakraborty (2010)
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Diagram 10: Environmental Performance Index (EPI) – 2008 vs. Democracy Index - 
2008 
 
Source: Mukherjee and Chakraborty (2010)
Environmental Performance Index (EPI)-2008 vs. Democracy Index (DI)-2008
35
45
55
65
75
85
95
1.5 2.5 3.5 4.5 5.5 6.5 7.5 8.5 9.5
Democracy Index (DI)-2008 Score
En
v
iro
n
m
en
ta
l P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
In
de
x
 
(E
PI
)-2
00
8 
Sc
o
re
 
 
 
 
 
 35 
Diagram 11: Environmental Performance Index (EPI) – 2008 vs. Corruption Perceptions 
Index - 2008 
 
Source: Mukherjee and Chakraborty (2010)
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